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Background: Global mental health is a relatively new field that has focused on disparities in mental health
services across different settings, and on innovative ways to provide feasible, acceptable, and effective services
in poorly-resourced settings. Neuroethics, too, is a relatively new field, lying at the intersection of bioethics and
neuroscience; it has studied the implications of neuroscientific findings for age-old questions in philosophy, as
well as questions about the ethics of novel neuroscientific methods and interventions.
Discussion: In this essay, we address a number of issues that lie at the intersection of these two fields: an
emphasis on a naturalist and empirical position, a concern with both disease and wellness, the importance
of human rights in neuropsychiatric care, and the value of social inclusion and patient empowerment.
Summary: These different disciplines share a number of perspectives, and future dialogue between the two
should be encouraged.
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Global mental health is a relatively new but highly influen-
tial field that has emerged from an awareness that there is
‘no health without mental health’ [1] and that there is a
need for psychiatric care that is not only cross-culturally
appropriate [2,3] but that can also be scaled up across the
globe [4]. Global mental health has relied on a number of
pre-existing fields of study. First, cross-national epidemio-
logical studies have emphasized that mental disorders are
prevalent across the globe, but are underdiagnosed and
undertreated, with the treatment gap widest in low- and
middle-income countries [5]. Second, studies in psychi-
atric anthropology, including work with immigrants
and refugees, have emphasised that understanding of
and interventions for mental disorders need to include
an appreciation of the relevant socio-cultural context
[6]. Practitioners of global mental health have focused
on advocating for measures to close the treatment gap
and on developing novel ways of doing so in under-
resourced regions [7], and such work has already had a
significant impact on psychiatric research and practice.* Correspondence: dan.stein@uct.ac.za
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unless otherwise stated.Neuroethics is similarly a relatively new but highly
influential field, which has emerged from ongoing work
in the areas of neuroscience, psychiatry, neurology and
bioethics, and that is becoming increasingly international
in scope [3,8,9]. On the one hand, neuroethics poses the
question of whether and how new findings in basic and
clinical neuroscience shed light on long-standing ques-
tions in philosophy, including the relationship between
brain and mind, and the nature of morality (that is, the
‘neuroscience of ethics’) [10]. On the other hand, neu-
roethics has addressed the ethical questions fostered by
novel neuroscientific methods and their applications in
research and medicine, including functional brain im-
aging, neurogenetic screening, psychopharmacological
treatments and enhancements, and the social implica-
tions of various neurotechnological interventions, such
as deep brain and transcranial magnetic stimulation
(that is, the ‘ethics of neuroscience’) [11]. Thus the field
draws on, but also expands bioethical work, and has
given rise to a rich set of interdisciplinary writings that
cover a broad range of issues [12].
While the broader convergences between psychiatry
and neuroethics also deserve attention, in this essay we
argue that some of the intersections between the import-
ant fields of global mental health and neuroethics are
particularly timely and potentially fruitful. The foci of
the neuroethics of global mental health are likely toCentral. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
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to more recent issues that have emerged as a result of
relatively new developments in the applications of neu-
roscientific methods to mental health research and care.
We will discuss in turn how both global mental health
and neuroethics have an emphasis on a naturalist and
empirical approach, on both disease and wellness, on
human rights in neuropsychiatric care, and on the value
of social inclusion and patient empowerment (Table 1).
Indeed, while global mental health and neuroethics are
quite different disciplines, they share a number of im-
portant perspectives, and an ongoing dialogue between
them should be encouraged.
Evidence-based medicine/empirical neuroethics
As a discipline, global mental health has emphasised
the importance of evidence-based clinical practices
[13]. Of particular relevance to attempts at employing
evidence-based medicine (EBM) in global mental health
is the 90:10 research gap: the vast proportion of mental
health research (90%) has focused on the relatively
small proportion of the world’s population that lives in
high income countries (10%) [14]. Likewise, clinical neuro-
science research has focused primarily on westernised,
educated, industrialised, rich and democratic (WEIRD)
populations [15]. Thus, there is a clear need for additional
mental health research to be undertaken in low- and
middle-income countries.
The need for empirically defined and articulated
research is equally crucial to neuroethics. A key pillar of
the field is a naturalistic view that posits that advances
in neuroscience may well shed light on philosophical
issues [16-18]. For example, the field has emphasised the
importance of neuroscientific approaches to examining
fundamental questions about the nature of the self, agencyTable 1 Intersections between global mental health and neur
Area of Intersection Global mental health
Naturalist and empirical approach * Importance of evidence
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decision-making and impulse control influence current
understanding of these constructs. Neuroethics has also
been particularly focused upon empirical approaches to
bioethical questions and has obtained data on a broad
range of such issues [18]. For example, advances in neuro-
imaging have provided impetus to exploring empirical
questions in neuroethics (such as whether imaging find-
ings in psychiatric disorders increase or decrease stigma?
[19]); but with the introduction of each novel instrument
or approach new queries and issues arise as to the validity
and value of these tools in research and clinical practices.
The emphasis of global mental health on evidence-
based practice and of neuroethics on empirical ethics,
are not entirely without controversy. It has often been
pointed out that an absence of evidence does not always
reflect evidence of absent efficacy or effect [20]. Given
that most mental health research has been undertaken
in areas where only a minority of the population lives, it
must be acknowledged that straightforward extrapola-
tion of the existing evidence-base is not always appropri-
ate. For example, there is a paucity of psychotherapy
trials conducted in the low- and middle-income world,
so that the extent to which Western psychotherapies
require adaptation in such contexts is somewhat unclear.
In addition, there may well be a need for value-based
orientations to supplement EBM [21]. Within meta-
philosophy, there are strong arguments that philosophy
should not simply be reduced to science [22]. Similarly, in
bioethics, there may well remain complex problems that
are best apprehended by conceptual rather than empirical
analysis.
Nevertheless, there are good reasons to support an
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precisely because so much work has been done in areas
where only a minority live, it is important to expand
research efforts in the low- and middle-income world.
Priorities for such research have been carefully set, and
this has facilitated requests for proposals to fund such
research [23]. In neuroethics, empirical research has
contributed to a range of discussions, including work on
childhood development, ageing research, the use and
value of various neurotechnologies, as well as how neuro-
scientific and psychosocial approaches can be employed to
develop improved assessment and treatment of mental,
neurological, and substance use disorders [11].
Focus on both disorder and wellness
The World Health Organization (WHO) definition of
health encompasses the concept of wellness, noting that
health is ‘a state of complete physical, mental and social
well-being and not merely the absence of disease or
infirmity’. This focus is consistent with the emphasis in
global mental health on human rights to access healthcare,
and on patient empowerment [1], and we can expect that
global mental health will pay increasing attention not only
to disorders but also to well-being. Clinical trials of task-
shifting of mental health interventions to lay community
health workers in low- and middle-income countries, for
example, may well include outcomes designed to measure
both symptom severity and also patient recovery [24].
There is ongoing neuroethical discussion about whether
the introduction of new neurotechnologies for the assess-
ment and treatment of neuropsychiatric disorders should
also be used in those with sub-threshold symptoms, or to
exceed ordinary capacities [25]. While part of the neu-
roethical focus is to ensure that novel technologies are
appropriately developed and correctly used, another part
reflects a commitment to employing such technologies in
ways that maximise the potential (and relative) benefit for
individuals and for societies [17].
There are, however, clear concerns with an emphasis
on well-being. While there is some agreement on what
constitutes a typical physical or mental disorder (for
example, a severe acute infection), there are persistent
ambiguities about the boundaries of normality (for ex-
ample, should binge-drinking be considered a mental
disorder?) [8], and there is even more disagreement
about what constitutes ‘well-being’ and flourishing (for
example, some definitions of well-being include notions
of ‘career consolidation’, which may not be equally rele-
vant in all parts of the globe) [26]. Furthermore, while
there are relatively good data on the efficacy and cost-
effectiveness of certain interventions for psychiatric disor-
ders (for example, antidepressants for severe depression),
there is a paucity of data on the efficacy and effectiveness
of interventions for ‘well-being’ [26]. To a great extent,such criteria and definitions may be cultural, and Parens
[27] and Sandel [28] have written persuasively about the
problem of relying upon both Western constructs of, and
technological approaches for addressing and attempting
to resolve, social ills.
It is our view that such controversies surrounding the
concept and/or conceptualisations of well-being and
flourishing demand and deserve attention. Both global
mental health and neuroethics have been critical of a
reductionistic approach to disorder [29,30]. Global men-
tal health is likely to focus initial research efforts on the
prevention and treatment of serious mental disorders,
rather than on maximising well-being in the community
[23], but even in this work it will be important to address
and emphasise patient recovery and empowerment. Simi-
larly, while neuroethics will seek to carefully monitor
and guide the appropriate use and just provision of new
neurotechnologies, novel opportunities to improve indi-
vidual and societal flourishing will become an increasingly
prominent topic for debate and practice [17].
Human rights/parity for mental health
Global mental health has placed significant emphasis on
acknowledging the human rights of those suffering from
mental illness [31]. A fundamental premise in this dis-
course is the right to appropriate treatment; there is ‘no
health without mental health’ [1] and any meaningful
approach to ‘global health’ must entail parity in resourcing
for physical and mental health services. Mental health
policies are required that ensure mental health and med-
ical services are equivalently prioritised, and which
indicate how the human rights of those suffering from
mental disorders will be vouchsafed during the develop-
ment of such services. Such policies should ensure that
mental health will be integrated into health services, and
that these will be made available in community settings.
Neuroethics, too, has been concerned with broad
issues of social policy. Indeed, the intersection of neuro-
science and social policy has been characterised as one
of the four pillars of neuroethics [16], concerned with the
social and legal implications of neuroscientific advances,
including health care disparities, and unequal access to
the benefits of such advances. For example, in considering
issues of neuroenhancement, it has been argued that
social resources should be conserved for treatment
(rather than enhancement), and that enhancement (for
example, the use of stimulant medications by students
and professionals to increase performance) may unfairly
favour more privileged sections of society that can
afford such interventions [28]. Therefore, it is import-
ant to address if, and ensure that, neurotechnologies
are not inappropriately used or purposefully misused to
fortify asymmetrical relationships between individuals,
groups and nations [8].
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not without controversy. First, concepts of human rights,
and indeed the idea of human rights itself may not repre-
sent a fixed natural kind, but rather may be bound to
specific times and places [32]. In light of this, a good deal
of conceptual work may be required in order to argue for
specific universal human rights. Further, the range of
moral concepts that can be employed to understand and
evaluate an ethical issue goes far beyond the class of
rights; such additional moral concepts include ‘duty’, ‘the
good’ and ‘virtue’ [33]. This point again emphasises the
need for additional conceptual analysis in this area.
Nevertheless, emphasising that the need for appropri-
ate treatment of mental disorders is closely linked to
human rights has provided global mental health with
an important ethical foundation. Similarly, there is an
ongoing need to emphasise human rights in the conduct
of neuroscience, so as to sustain ethical practices in basic
and clinical neuroscientific research, and sound ethical
precepts in establishing and implementing clinical assess-
ments and interventions. Such concerns constitute a
second pillar of neuroethics [12,16]. As the agenda of
global mental health gives increasing impetus to mental
health research being undertaken in low- and middle-
income countries [23], so, too, will there be a need to
concomitantly increase attention and dedication to neu-
roethical issues arising in and from these settings [17].
Social inclusion/consumer movements
A recurring rallying cry in global mental health has been
‘nothing for us, without us’, emphasising the importance
of including consumers in decision-making about services
and research [34]. The voice of the consumer movement
has played a crucial role in disability studies in general
and is particularly relevant to mental health concerns [35].
Global mental health publications have emphasised the
importance of consulting consumers and the value of a
‘recovery perspective’ that seeks to establish and enhance
patient empowerment [24]. Similarly, much of the litera-
ture in global mental health has emphasised the import-
ance of ensuring that assessments and interventions
developed for use in low- and middle-income countries
are, in fact, feasible and acceptable to individuals who live
in these contexts [36].
Likewise, neuroethics has acknowledged the import-
ance of individuals’ subjective experiences and of patient
empowerment. Brain imaging, for example, provides
certain objective correlates of human cognition and affect.
Yet, imaging data cannot reveal or ‘describe’ an individ-
ual’s unique thoughts and emotions [18]. A gap persists
between subjectivity and objectivity, which is important
to acknowledge and address if, and when, considering
the utility and limitations of specific neuroscientific
approaches to diagnostics and clinical intervention. Athird pillar of neuroethics has focused upon the role,
relevance, and importance of brain science to concepts of
the ‘self ’ [12,16]; for instance, data that certain genetic
variants are associated with decreased impulse control may
lead to more nuanced discussion of the nature of moral
responsibility and free will. Similarly, literature on psycho-
pharmacology has discussed issues such as the meaning of
medication for patients, the extent to which the self is
transformed by pharmacotherapy, and the extent to which
psychotropic agents not only improve symptom outcomes
but may also contribute to human flourishing [37].
Still, an emphasis on patients’ subjective experience
and empowerment is not without controversy. Robert
Spitzer, a key architect of the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders, third edition (DSM-III),
argued that including patients when revising psychiatric
nosology would be ‘…political correctness taken too far’
[38]. Advances in neuroscience seem to promise a world
in which clinical diagnosis will be made using biomarkers,
neuroimaging and neurogenetics, rather than by merely
assessing patients’ history and symptoms [39]. To be sure,
neurobiologically-based models (for example, that are
reliant upon and derived from neurogenetics, neuro-
anatomy and/or neurochemistry) of mental disorder(s)
may well have important advantages to the extent that
neurotechnologies, such as brain imaging and biomarker
analyses, may enable more accurate diagnosis and effective
treatment [40,41], provided that potential burdens and
harms are minimised [8,12,17].
Nevertheless, an emphasis on social inclusion, consumer
voices and patient empowerment is sure to remain import-
ant for global mental health, neuroethics and their inter-
section. The global mental health movement is likely to
pay particular attention to any suggestion that it is ignoring
such issues [42]. Neuroethics has a strong commitment
to proactive and preparatory stances that promote both
responsible social and public policies, and the value of
empowerment [18,43]. Moreover, in mental health and
neuroethics – as in medicine, in general - there is a need
for an integrative, conceptual approach that addresses bio-
logical mechanisms that underlie the symptoms of mental
disorders, as well as patients’ expression and experience of
such symptoms [12,37].
Summary
Global mental health and neuroethics are two important
fields of study and practice which, while coming of age
over the past decade, have had relatively little direct
interaction. Perhaps this is not surprising given the dif-
ferences in their foci. Global mental health has focused
upon the low- and middle-income world, while neuroethics
has tended to address issues somewhat more relevant to
Western, higher income countries. Global mental health
is focused on implementation science - often adapting
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roethics is focused on new technologies and novel tech-
niques. Global mental health has emphasised the value
of employing lay community health workers to assist
with mental health interventions, while neuroethics has
explored highly specialised technical procedures such as
functional brain imaging and deep brain stimulation.
Yet, as these disciplines mature, consolidate, and are
joined by the growing foci and applications of social and
cultural neuroscience [44], and expanding efforts in global
mobile health (mhealth) and in neurogenetics [45,46], we
can expect that there will be a number of important op-
portunities for dialogue and mutual engagement in prac-
tice. Our view is that there are a number of areas in global
mental health and neuroethics that foster and support
converging perspectives, including an emphasis on a nat-
uralist and empirical position, a concern with both disease
and wellness, the importance of human rights in neuro-
psychiatric care, and the value of social inclusion and pa-
tient empowerment (Table 1). While there are also
important intersections between psychiatry as a whole
and neuroethics, these convergences between global
mental health and neuroethics seem to have particular
potential for growth and for positive social effects.
The differences and convergences between global
mental health and neuroethics may well lead to a rich
conversation between these fields. This essay, albeit
brief, may contribute a small start; we look forward to a
more extended and detailed discussion. Such work will
hopefully address a range of reciprocally pertinent issues,
including the neuroethical aspects of current global men-
tal health research, as well as the expansion of neuroethi-
cal research to address the probity of allocating new
developments in neuroscience and neurotechnology to
the low- and middle-income world. Our view and aspir-
ation is that just as psychiatric research in low- and
middle-income countries may have lessons for high-
income countries, so too lessons from basic, clinical and
cultural neuroscience in non-WEIRD settings may impact
positively on the development and articulation of an inter-
national neuroethics that is capable of guiding neurosci-
ence and its clinical applications throughout the globe.
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